Recalling a Witnessed Event Increases Eyewitness Suggestibility The Reversed Testing Effect by Chan, Jason C.K. et al.
Psychology Publications Psychology
1-2009
Recalling a Witnessed Event Increases Eyewitness
Suggestibility The Reversed Testing Effect
Jason C.K. Chan





Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/psychology_pubs
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Evidence Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
psychology_pubs/23. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Psychology Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recalling a Witnessed Event Increases Eyewitness Suggestibility The
Reversed Testing Effect
Abstract
People's later memory of an event can be altered by exposure to misinformation about that event. The typical
misinformation paradigm, however, does not include a recall test prior to the introduction of misinformation,
contrary to what real-life eyewitnesses encounter when they report to a 911 operator or crime-scene officer.
Because retrieval is a powerful memory enhancer (the testing effect), recalling a witnessed event prior to
receiving misinformation about it should reduce eyewitness suggestibility. We show, however, that immediate
cued recall actually exacerbates the later misinformation effect for both younger and older adults. The reversed
testing effect we observed was based on two mechanisms: First, immediate cued recall enhanced learning of
the misinformation; second, the initially recalled details became particularly susceptible to interference from
later misinformation, a finding suggesting that even human episodic memory may undergo a reconsolidation
process. These results show that real-life eyewitness memory may be even more susceptible to misinformation
than is currently envisioned.
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People’s later memory of an event can be altered by exposure to misinformation (Loftus, 1979).  
The typical misinformation paradigm, however, does not include a recall test prior to the 
introduction of misinformation, which is what real-life eyewitnesses encounter when they report 
to a 911 operator or crime scene officer.  Because retrieval is a powerful memory enhancer (the 
testing effect), recalling a witnessed event prior to misinformation should reduce eyewitness 
suggestibility.  Here we show that immediate cued recall actually exacerbates the later 
misinformation effect for both younger and older adults.  This reversed testing effect occurred 
based on two mechanisms:  First, immediate cued recall enhanced learning of the 
misinformation; second, the initially recalled details became particularly susceptible to 
interference from later misinformation, suggesting that even human episodic memory may 
undergo a reconsolidation process.  These results show that real-life eyewitness memory may be 
even more malleable to misinformation than is currently envisioned. 
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Recalling a witnessed event increases eyewitness suggestibility: The reversed testing effect 
Since Bartlett’s pioneering work (1932), researchers have repeatedly demonstrated the 
malleability of human memory (e.g., Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995).  Loftus’s misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1979), in particular, has 
translated traditional verbal learning research findings (e.g., Keppel & Underwood, 1962) into an 
ecologically relevant setting – namely, that eyewitness memory is malleable to exposure to 
misinformation.  The Loftus paradigm (e.g., Lindsay, Allen, Chan, & Dahl, 2004; Loftus, Miller, 
& Burns, 1978) includes three phases: First, subjects are exposed to a witnessed event (e.g., a 
video).  Second, subjects are exposed to a narrative description of the witnessed event that 
contains misinformation.  Third, subjects take a memory test for the witnessed event.  The 
typical finding is that people are less likely to recall the correct details following misinformation.  
Interestingly, this three-phase procedure misses a potentially important component in real-life 
situations – the occurrence of a recall test prior to the introduction of misinformation (for 
exceptions, see  Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001; Saunders & MacLeod, 2002)1.  In real-life 
situations, an eyewitness usually recalls the witnessed event at the crime scene, and most likely 
prior to encountering any misinformation.  What are the implications of taking such immediate 
“tests” on eyewitness suggestibility? 
Research suggests that taking an immediate test may reduce a person’s susceptibility to 
misinformation.  According to the traditional verbal learning literature (Erdelyi & Becker, 1974) 
and more recently the testing effect literature (Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006), immediate 
recall should enhance retention of the witnessed event; thereby rendering people less susceptible 
to misinformation.  In the present study, we conducted three experiments to test this hypothesis.  
In Experiment 1A, we compared the final recall performance between young adults who have 
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completed an immediate cued recall test with those who have not taken such a test.  In 
Experiment 1B, we attempted to replicate and extend Experiment 1A’s finding to older adults, 
who are more prone to having erroneous recollections (Chan & McDermott, 2007a; Thomas & 
Sommers, 2005).  In Experiment 2, we attempted to uncover the mechanisms that underlie 
Experiment 1A and 1B’s findings. 
Experiment 1A 
Methods 
Participants.  Thirty-six undergraduate students (N = 18 for each testing condition; 20 female 
and 16 male) from Washington University in St. Louis participated in this experiment for course 
research credit.   
Materials and Procedure.  Subjects first viewed a ~40 min episode of the television program 
“24” (the witnessed event).2  No subjects had seen this video before.  Subjects in the testing 
condition then took an immediate recall test on 24 details of the video (e.g., Question: What did 
the terrorist use to knock out the flight attendant?  Answer [not provided to subjects]: A 
hypodermic syringe), whereas subjects in the no-testing condition played Tetris (a computerized 
falling-rock puzzle game) for the same amount of time (12 min).  During the cued recall test, 
subjects were told to type in their answers within 25 s of the question onset.  Accuracy was 
encouraged and participants were not required to produce an answer.  No corrective feedback 
was provided.  Subjects in both the testing and no-testing conditions then completed a brief 
demographic questionnaire, a synonym and antonym vocabulary test (Salthouse, 1993), and 
computerized Operation Span (OSPAN) (Kane & Engle, 2003) as distractor tasks.  This 
distractor phase lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
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Participants then listened to an 8 min audio narrative that described the video.  They were 
told that the narrative was a recap of the video (the experimenter did not warn subjects about the 
veridicality of the narrative).  Of the 24 details targeted by the immediate test, 8 of them were 
presented correctly in the narrative (consistent.  E.g., [the terrorist] knocks the flight attendant 
unconscious with a hypodermic syringe), 8 were not mentioned in the narrative (control.  E.g., 
[the terrorist] knocks the flight attendant unconscious), and 8 were changed in the narrative 
(misleading.  E.g., [the terrorist] knocks the flight attendant unconscious with a chloroform rag).  
The misleading information always involved replacing a specific item with a plausible 
alternative.  Each critical detail appeared only once in the narrative and whether the detail was 
consistent, control, or misleading was counterbalanced across subjects.  Both focal and non-focal 
details were modified.  Pilot testing ensured that all items were able to elicit false recall at a 
reasonable rate (M = .21).  The final cued recall test was identical to the immediate test and 
subjects were told to report the information presented in the video.  Overall, the only difference 
between subjects in the two testing conditions was whether the subjects have taken an immediate 
test. 
Results and Discussion 
Results are reported with an alpha level of .05 unless otherwise noted; prep indicates the 
probability of replicating the direction of an effect.  During the immediate recall test, 63% of 
subjects’ response were accurate recall, 3% matched the misinformation (i.e., baserate false 
recall), 9% were no answers or  “I don’t know”, and 24% were responses that neither matched 
the correct answer nor the misinformation – these responses were classified as “Other”.    
More important for current purposes are the results from the final test.  Surprisingly, not 
only did immediate testing fail to reduce the misinformation effect, it greatly increased the 
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misinformation effect!  Figure 1 displays the means of accurate and misinformation recall for 
subjects in the testing and no-testing conditions.  The three-way interaction between testing 
condition (testing vs. no-testing), question type (consistent, control, misleading), and response 
type (correct vs. misinformation recall), was significant, F(2, 33) = 4.51, prep > .93.  Subjects in 
the two testing conditions performed comparably on the consistent and control questions but not 
on the misleading questions.  No ANOVA was conducted to examine the two-way interactions 
(between testing condition and response type) because the probabilities of correct and 
misinformation recall were partially complementary (see Table 1 for probabilities of responses 
that belong to the No answer and Other categories).  A planned comparison, however, reveals 
that subjects who had taken the immediate test were much more likely (~20%, see the rightmost 
pair of bars in Figure 1) to recall the misinformation than subjects who had not taken such a test, 
t(34) = 2.49, prep = .98, which is a reversed testing effect on misinformation suggestibility! 
For the control questions, accurate recall probability was at 65% in the testing condition 
and 62% in the no-testing condition (see the third pair of bars in Figure 1), t < 1, prep = .62.  Why 
did the control questions fail to show a significant testing effect?  Because the testing effect tends 
to increase with delay (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), it is possible that the current (25 min) delay 
might not have been long enough for the testing advantage to be revealed, though the difference 
is in the expected direction.   
Experiment 1B 
 Experiment 1B was designed to extend Experiment 1A’s findings to a different subject 
group – older adults.  Older adults are of particular interest for current purposes because they are 
frequently involved in eyewitness memory situations and they are particularly susceptible to the 
misinformation effect (Roediger & Geraci, 2007), but they are also capable of suppressing false 
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memories with appropriate training (McDermott & Chan, 2006; Thomas & Bulevich, 2006).   
Therefore, it is unclear whether older adults will show the same counterintuitive effect as the 
younger adults. 
Methods 
Participants.  Sixty healthy, community-dwelling older adults (N = 30 for each testing condition; 
39 female and 21 male) participated for $15.  They were recruited from the older adult subject 
pool maintained by the psychology department at Washington University.  None of the 
participants have seen “24” before.  The average age was 72.57 (SD = 8.56) for the testing group 
and 74.37 (SD = 7.79) for the no-testing group, t < 1.  Average years of education was 15.33 (SD 
= 3.46) for the testing group and 14.00 (SD = 2.42) for the no-testing group, t(58) = 1.73, p = .09.  
Finally, average vocabulary scores was .72 (SD = .27) for the testing group and .58 (SD = .27) 
for the no-testing group, t(58) = 1.94, p =.06.3   
Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1A with 
the following exceptions.  First, subjects completed the tests on paper instead of on the computer.  
Second, the older adults worked on logic and lateral thinking problems 
(http://www.folj.com/lateral/) instead of the OSPAN task, because pilot testing revealed that the 
OSPAN task was too difficult for them.   
Results and Discussion 
 Older adults recalled approximately 40% of the correct details during the initial test.  
Moreover, 19% of the time they did not answer a question, 7% of the time they provided an 
answer that matched the misinformation, and 34% of the time they provided an answer in the 
“Other” category.   
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Figure 2 displays results of the final test, which shows that older adults demonstrated the 
same surprising pattern as their younger counterparts.  The three-way interaction between testing 
condition, question type, and response type was significant, F(2, 57) = 7.86, prep = 99.  That is, 
similar to younger adults, older adults who had taken the initial test showed dramatically 
heightened (~20%) susceptibility to misinformation, t(58) = 3.87, prep = .99.  Interestingly, they 
also showed a greater testing effect (on accurate recall) for the control (~9%) and consistent 
(~10%) questions, though neither comparisons were statistically significant, possibly due to 
power issues (observed powers < .35), both ps > .10, but both preps > .79.  One possible reason 
that older adults demonstrated a greater (though nonsignificant) testing effect than the younger 
adults is that they forget information at a faster rate (Floden, Stuss, & Craik, 2000), and the 
testing effect is typically more robust after forgetting has set in.   
 In sum, although older adults were much less likely to recall the correct details during the 
final test, they were as likely as the younger adults to recall the misinformation.  Critically, both 
younger and older adults were more susceptible to the misinformation effect after having taken 
an initial recall test. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiments 1A and 1B show that, contrary to the hypothesis we proposed based on the 
testing effect, initial testing can substantially enhance the misinformation effect.  What potential 
processes could have led to such counterintuitive results?  Two findings may prove helpful in 
further understanding this reversed testing effect on misinformation.  The first, coming from the 
verbal learning literature, is termed the insulation effect (Tulving & Watkins, 1974).  
Specifically, if subjects need to learn two paired associates sequentially (e.g., A-B and then A-
D), recall of A-D is improved if subjects have taken a test on A-B before learning A-D, relative 
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to a condition in which subjects did not take a test on A-B before learning A-D.  That is, prior 
testing enhances learning of new information.  When this logic is applied to the current finding, 
it suggests that the reversed testing effect occurred because the testing subjects learned the 
misinformation better than the no-testing subjects (see also, Izawa, 1967).   
Another finding that may prove helpful in explaining our results is that consolidated 
memories can return to a labile state after they have been reactivated (Nader, Schafe, & Le 
Doux, 2000; Walker, Brakefield, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2003).  That is, when a consolidated 
memory is reactivated, it must undergo reconsolidation, during which the reactivated memory is 
particularly susceptible to interference (Nader et al., 2000; Walker et al., 2003).  Applying this 
logic to the current scenario, subjects in the testing condition reactivated their memories of the 
witnessed event during the immediate test, thus making those memories more susceptible to 
interference (by misinformation) than subjects in the no-testing condition.4  
 In this experiment, we tested these possibilities in a modified-modified free recall 
(MMFR) design.  Barnes and Underwood (1959) devised the MMFR procedure to minimize 
response competition when subjects need to recall multiple targets associated with a single cue 
(e.g., A-B, A-D).  In this procedure, subjects are told to recall everything that is associated with a 
cue regardless of the study order.  That is, when they encounter cue A, subject should recall both 
B and D.   
When the MMFR task is used in the present context, it allows one to observe how initial 
testing affects learning of the misinformation.  Specifically, according to the insulation effect, 
initial testing should enhance the recall probability of the misinformation, but it should have little 
effect on the recall probability of the original (correct) details.  In contrast, according to the 
reconsolidation account, initial testing should increase the original memory’s susceptibility to 
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interference, thereby reducing the probability of accurate recall, but it should have little effect on 
misinformation recall.   
Methods 
Participants.  A total of 48 undergraduate students (N = 24 for each testing condition; 28 female 
and 20 male) from Washington University participated.  None of the participants have seen this 
particular episode of “24” within one month of the experiment, and 42 of them had never seen 
the first season of “24”. 
Procedure.  All experimental protocols were the same between Experiment 2 and Experiment 1A 
until the final test, at which point subjects were given the MMFR instructions.  Subjects were 
told to recall everything they could remember for each question in the final test, regardless of the 
accuracy or source of the memory.    
Results and Discussion 
 For the initial test, accurate recall occupied 63% of the responses, while misinformation, 
no answer, and other responses occupied 5%, 5% and 27% of the responses, respectively.  Figure 
3 displays results of the final test (see also Table 1), which show that the reversed testing effect 
on misinformation can be attributed to enhanced learning of the misinformation due to initial 
testing (see Figure 3), which supports the insulation effect account.  I now provide statistical 
support for this impression before turning to the reconsolidation possibility. 
 Similar to Experiments 1A and 1B, a 2 (testing condition) X 3 (question type) X 2 
(response type) ANOVA showed a three-way interaction, F(2, 45) = 9.12, prep = .99.  Of 
particular interest here is whether testing affected the recall probabilities of the misleading 
questions, it did.  Specifically, there was a significant interaction between testing condition and 
response type, F(1, 46) = 9.99, prep = .97.  A planned comparison shows that, consistent with the 
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insulation effect prediction, subjects who had taken the initial test recalled considerably more 
misinformation than subjects who had not taken the initial test (21% more, see the rightmost pair 
of bars in Figure 3), t(46) = 5.03, prep = .99.  Moreover, the magnitude of this effect closely 
matches the magnitude of the reversed testing effect in Experiment 1A and 1B.   
No difference was found in the correct recall probabilities (for the misleading questions) 
between the testing subjects (.54) and the no-testing subjects (.52), t < 1, prep = .30 (see the fifth 
pair of bars in Figure 3).  On the surface, this null effect may indicate that the reconsolidation 
idea fails to explain the reversed testing effect on misinformation.  However, this comparison is 
clouded by a confound between the benefits of testing and the negative impact of interference 
during the reconsolidation process.  That is, this null effect might have occurred because subjects 
in the testing condition (the gray bar) benefited from taking the initial test, but this benefit was 
masked by the negative impact of reconsolidation.   
To examine whether our data support the reconsolidation account without this confound, 
we compared the level of interference experienced by subjects who had taken the initial test with 
those who had not.  The magnitude of interference was estimated by the within subjects 
comparison between the recall probabilities of the control and misleading questions.  This 2 
(question type: control, misleading) X 2 (testing condition) ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between question type and testing condition, F(1, 46) = 5.47, prep = .92.  Specifically, 
no significant interference was found for the subjects who did not reactivate their witnessed 
event memories before encountering the misinformation (a -3% interference effect; compare the 
third and fifth white bars), t(23) = 1.07, prep = .65.  However, substantial interference was 
observed (a 9% interference effect, compare the third and fifth gray bars) for subjects in the 
testing condition, t(23) = 2.16, prep = .89.  This pattern is consistent with the reconsolidation 
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account, which states that recently retrieved memories become particularly susceptible to 
interference. 
In addition to the above findings, the current experiment also showed a significant (13%) 
testing effect for the control details (see the third pair of bars), t(46) = 2.68, prep = .95, such that 
initial testing enhanced later recall if no interfering misinformation was presented.  This result 
shows that it is possible to obtain the reversed testing effect on misinformation even when a 
significant, regular testing effect is found for the control questions. 
General Discussion 
Our results provide a first look into how immediate recall affects later eyewitness 
suggestibility.  Contrary to the belief that immediate recall would enhance retention of details of 
a witnessed event and thus reduce an eyewitness’ susceptibility to misinformation, here we have 
shown that immediate recall actually intensifies the misinformation effect (for both younger and 
older adults).  This reversed testing effect on misinformation might be based on two 
mechanisms.  First, initial recall enhances the learning of later misinformation and second, initial 
recall increases the recently recalled items’ propensity to interference. 
Testing Enhances Learning of Misinformation 
The finding that retrieval enhances learning of subsequent misinformation joins other 
evidence in showing that testing has two primary effects on learning.  First, testing directly 
enhances long-term retention of the tested materials (Chan et al., 2006; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006).  Second, testing enhances learning of new materials that are presented after the initial test 
(Izawa, 1967; Tulving & Watkins, 1974).  How can testing enhance subsequent learning of the 
new/misleading information?  There are two possibilities.  First, testing may serve to reduce the 
level of proactive interference that original learning asserts on new learning (Chan & 
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McDermott, 2007b; Szpunar, McDermott, & Roediger, 2008). One possible way for this to 
happen is that memory for the test episode may serve to differentiate the first encoding event 
(witnessed event) from the second encoding event (misinformation narrative).  Second, testing 
may potentiate new learning by drawing attention to specific aspects of the witnessed event.  
When subjects encountered the misinformation narrative, the items that were presented during 
the initial test might “pop out” and thus were better encoded.  If this were the case, then it would 
explain why the current pattern might be difficult to obtain if the immediate test is free recall 
(Lane et al., 2001), because it is possible that subjects never recalled the critical details (i.e., the 
details that will eventually be presented as misinformation) during the initial test. 
Recently Recalled Information are More Susceptible to Interference 
The present experiments have demonstrated that recently recalled information may be 
particularly susceptible to interference.  Although this pattern is consistent with the 
reconsolidation idea, it does not completely rule out other potential explanations.  In particular, it 
is possible that subjects in the testing condition did not suffer more interference during a 
reconsolidation process, but that enhanced learning of the misinformation increased the level of 
response competition at retrieval during the final test.  Because initial testing enhanced learning 
of the misinformation, it might also increase the likelihood that recall of the misinformation 
would block retrieval of the original detail (Roediger, 1978), even though the MMFR procedure 
was supposed to minimize such blocking.  Although this response competition explanation 
seems plausible, one piece of evidence argues against it.  Specifically, if response competition at 
retrieval is the basis for our pattern in the MMFR procedure, then it is difficult to see how 
subjects in the no-testing condition showed no interference from the misinformation at all.  That 
is, no difference was found in the recall probabilities between the items that were supposed to be 
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interfered by misinformation (misleading details) and those that were not (control details).  This 
finding suggests that the MMFR procedure had, to an extent, minimized the influence of 
response competition.  Therefore, though perhaps tentative, we might have indeed obtained 
evidence for a reconsolidation process in human episodic memory (see also, Hupbach, Gomez, 
Hardt, & Nadel, 2007). 
Why are memories that are undergoing reconsolidation particularly susceptible to 
interference?  From a cognitive perspective, recently reactivated memories may enhance binding 
of events between the original encoding episode (the video) and the new encoding episode (the 
narrative) because the recently recalled memories provide a clear context for such binding to 
occur (Lyle & Johnson, 2006).  This hypothesis, though somewhat speculative, is supported by 
the evidence that the hippocampus plays an important role in both reconsolidation (Rossato et al., 
2007) and binding (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & D'Esposito, 2000). 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the underlying reasons for the reversed testing effect on misinformation, 
our results indicate that even psychologists might have underestimated the malleability of 
eyewitness memory.   When people have recently recalled information about the witnessed event 
and are then exposed to misinformation, they markedly increase their susceptibility to the 
misinformation.  These results further confirmed the notion that not only does recall indicate 
what we know, but it also changes what we know, and sometimes these changes can have far-
reaching, and perhaps negative, consequences. 
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1In both of these studies subjects have performed retrieval practice on the witnessed event before 
they encountered misinformation.  However, unlike the current study, Lane and colleagues’ 
(2001) used free recall instead of a cued recall as the initial test.  In Saunders and MacLeod’s 
(2002) experiments, all subjects had taken an initial free recall test prior to the introduction of 
misinformation (i.e., they did not have a no-testing group). 
2We used the first episode of the first season of “24” as the witnessed event material.  The audio 
narrative was created by modifying the episode guide provided by Fox on www.fox.com/24. 
3To ensure that subject selection artifacts did not contribute to the findings of Experiment 1B, we 
equated the older adults on vocabulary scores by selecting the 25 highest scoring individuals in 
the no-testing group (M = .66, SD = .21) and the 25 lowest scoring individuals in the testing 
group (M = .66, SD = .27), t < 1.  Consistent with the results reported in the main text, these 
subjects still demonstrated a reversed testing effect on misinformation recall (M = .32 for no-
testing and M = .50 for testing, t = 3.06) and a regular, but nonsignificant, testing effect on 
accurate recall for the control (M =.32 for no-testing and M =.37 for testing, t < 1) and consistent 
questions (M =.61 for no-testing and M =.66 for testing, t < 1).  Similarly, we equated education 
level by comparing the 25 individuals with the most education in the no-testing condition (M = 
14.56, SD = 2.14) to the 25 individuals with the least education in the testing condition (M = 
14.28, SD = 2.70), t < 1.  Again, there was a reversed testing effect on misinformation recall (M 
= .32 for no-testing and M = .51 for testing, t = 3.41) and a regular, but nonsignificant, testing 
effect on accurate recall for the control (M =.32 for no-testing and M =.35 for testing, t < 1) and 
consistent questions (M =.61 for no-testing and M =.66 for testing, t < 1).  These results suggest 
that subject selection artifacts did not contribute to the reversed testing effect on misinformation. 
Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich   21 
21 
 
4One assumption of this hypothesis is that memories of the video event has been consolidated to 
a larger extent in the no-testing condition than in the testing condition when subject encountered 
the interfering audio narrative -- a delay of approximately 35 minutes.  Although memory 
consolidation is typically thought to takes hours to days (or years) to complete, recently 
researchers have suggested that consolidation can occur within minutes of encoding (Fulton, 
Kemenes, Andrew, & Benjamin, 2005). 
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 Table 1. 
Probabilities of responses that belong to the “Other” and “No Answer” categories as a function 
of testing condition and question type for all three experiments.  Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
 Experiment 1A  Experiment 1B  Experiment 2 




.11 (.10) .11 (.07) .19 (.19) .23 (.19) .18 (.13) .16 (.11) 
No Answer  
.02 (.05) .00 (.00) .08 (.12) .13 (.22) .02 (.04) .03 (.06) 
Control Questions 
Other  
.26 (.17) .30 (.18) .35 (.22) .41 (.20) .25 (.14) .34 (.17) 
No Answer  
.07 (.11) .03 (.05) .20 (.21) .23 (.19) .07 (.09) .14 (.14) 
Misleading Questions 
Other  
.09 (.11) .17 (.19) .20 (.15) .30 (.14) .18 (.13) .24 (.15) 
No Answer  
.03 (.05) .01 (.03) .08 (.14) .13 (.17) .04 (.11) .02 (.05) 
 





Figure 1.  Younger adults were substantially more likely to recall the misinformation presented 
in the narrative as part of the original video/witnessed event if they had taken an 
immediate test prior to being exposed to the misinformation than if they had not taken 
such an immediate test.  Error bars are within-subjects .95 CI. 
Figure 2.  Similar to the results depicted in Figure 1.  Older adults were also more likely to 
mistakenly recall the misinformation during the final test.  Moreover, they also 
demonstrated a stronger testing effect for the consistent and control questions.  Error bars 
are within-subjects .95 CI. 
Figure 3.  Initial testing exacerbated the misinformation effect by enhancing learning of the 
misinformation (compare the rightmost gray bar to its adjacent white bar) and by 
suppressing recall of the original/correct information (compare the third gray bar to the 
fifth gray bar).  Error bars are within-subjects .95 CI. 
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